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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs claims on the 
basis that Plaintiffs claims were barred by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-7-402. This Court has jurisdiction over this transferred appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)0) (2012). The Utah Supreme Court's had jurisdiction 
over the appeal pursuant to §78A-3-102(3)0") (2009). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT VIEW THE FACTS 
PRESENTED IN THE COMPLAINT AND THE INSURANCE CLAIM 
LETTER IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When reviewing summary judgment, the Court "reviewfs] 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 101, If 2, 57 P.3d 1067 
(internal quotation omitted). 
PRESERVATION: Plaintiff set out the continuing nature of the trespass in Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 67). 
The continuing nature of the trespass is plain from the statements in Mr. Orosco's 
affidavit, the Insurance Claim for Water Damage and the Complaint. Orosco Affidavit 
(R. at 63); see also Insurance Claim for Water Damage (R. at 55-57) (water entering 
home in spring 2006, spring 2007, and August 2008); Complaint at 1f 18 (R. at 3). 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT < 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ARE WHOLLY BARRED BY THE 
LIMITATION PERIOD PROVIDED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-
402. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, ! 
[appellate courts] give no deference to [the trial court's] conclusions of law." Dick 
Simon Trucking, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2004 UT 11, 1j 3, 84 P.3d 1197 (citations 
omitted). The grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Id. "Likewise, a 
district court's interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that [appellate 
courts] review for correctness." kL The applicability of a statute of limitations is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 
2005 UT 14, H 18, 108 P.3d 741. When reviewing summary judgment, the Court 
"review[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 101, ^ 2, 57 
P.3d 1067 (internal quotation omitted). 
PRESERVATION: Petitioner argued in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that the continuing tort doctrine precluded a 
j grant of summary judgment and therefore preserved this issue for appeal (see R. at 67-
69). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATl'TKS AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service — 
Legal disahilih — Appointment of guardian ad litem. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the statute of 
limitations that would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known: 
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its employee; and 
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the employee. 
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant. 
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee 
for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim 
with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
 t 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and 
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(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as 
provided in Subsection 63G-7-202(3)(c), the name of the employee. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
 ; 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or 
legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the requirements of Section 
68-3-8.5 to the office of: 
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is 
against a school district or board of education; 
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when the claim is against a 
local district or special service district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the state; 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, 
when the claim is against any other public board, commission, or body; or 
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the 
governmental entity under Subsection (5)(e). 
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim against a 
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governmental entity is sustained by a claimant who is under the age of majority or 
mentally incompetent, that governmental entity may file a request with the court for the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for the potential claimant. 
(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for filing a claim under Section 63G-
7-402 begins when the order appointing the guardian is issued. ' 
(5) (a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file a 
statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the 
Department of Commerce containing: 
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity; 
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and 
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered. 
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to ensure that the 
information is accurate. 
(c) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall develop a form for 
governmental entities to complete that provides the information required by Subsection 
(5)(a). 
(d) (i) A newly incorporated municipality shall file the statement required by 
Subsection (5)(a) promptly after the lieutenant governor issues a certificate of 
incorporation under Section 67-1 a-6.5. 
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(ii) A newly incorporated local district shall file the statement required by Subsection 
(5)(a) at the time that the written notice is filed with the lieutenant governor under 
Section 17B-1-215. 
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent authorized by the 
entity to accept notices of claim on its behalf 
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall: f 
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section arranged both • 
alphabetically by entity and by county of operation; and 
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via hard copy. 
(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim on the 
grounds that it was not directed and delivered to the proper office or agent if the error is 
caused by the governmental entity's failure to file or update the statement required by 
Subsection (5). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-402. Time for filing notice of claim. 
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
person and according to the requirements of Section 63G-7-401 within one year after the 
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claim arises regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-403. Notice of claim — Approval or denial by governmental 
entity or insurance carrier within 60 days — Remedies for denial of claim. 
(1) (a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental entity or its 
insurance carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the claim has either been 
approved or denied. 
(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day period, the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
(2) (a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court 
against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim or 
within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-303. One year — Actions on claims against county, city, or 
town. 
Actions on claims against a county, city, or incorporated town, which have been 
rejected by the county executive, city commissioners, city council, or board of trustees 
shall be brought within one year after the first rejection. 
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1 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment 
4 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the i 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
I affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
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substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
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(t) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just, 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Orosco has sued Clinton City. In his complaint he alleged that water 
repeatedly entered his basement and that Clinton City water lines were the source of the 
water and sought damages on theories of negligence and nuisance (R. at 2-3). Plaintiff 
has been experiencing intermittent flooding in his basement since 2004 (R. at 2, 54, 61). 
He long suspected that Clinton City's culinary water system was the source of the water 
but only had limited proof as to the source of the water (see R. at 62-63). The City, 
through its agents, unsuccessfully sought a leak and finding none denied that the water 
was from its water lines (see R. at 56-57, 61). Plaintiff finally obtained sufficient 
evidence to allege that the water was from the City (R. at 63) and served a demand letter 
to the city on approximately May 10, 2010, by delivering the letter to the agent identified 
in Clinton City code (R. at 3). Receiving no satisfactory response, Plaintiff filed the 
complaint in this matter on December 28, 2010 (R. at 1). 
Defendant Clinton City moved for summary judgment on the basis that the 
complaint was barred by Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-7-402 and/or 78B-2-303 (R. at 43, 47, 
50). Defendant's motion proceeded as though the facts in the Complaint were true and 
sought a finding that Mr. Orosco's claims were time barred (see R. at 46-47, relying on 
facts in complaint as factual basis). The motion relied exclusively upon the Complaint 
and a notarized letter signed by the Plaintiff (R. at 45-59). Plaintiff opposed the motion 
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(R. at 60-65, 66-71). The court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis ofthe 
documents and no hearing was requested or held on the matter (R. at 91, 94). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The only facts upon which Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment were decided 
were the contents of Plaintiff s Complaint (see R. at 46-47 where Clinton City relies upon 
allegations in the Complaint as factual support for its motion), a notarized letter from 
Plaintiff to Clinton City's insurance company (R. at 54), and Fernando Orosco's affidavit 
(R. at 78). These documents were the only evidence before the Court when it ruled on 
the City's motion. PlaintilT pointed to his complaint (R. at 69) and provided the affidavit 
(R. at 60) in response to the Defendant's statement of facts. 
1. In September 2004, water entered and damaged the basement of Mr. Orosco's 
home in Clinton City. (R. at 54, 61). 
2. The water enters Mr. Orosco's home from the outside. (R. at 2, 63). 
3. Water seeped into the home from time to time during the subsequent years, 
sometimes stopping for months at a time and then starting again (R. at 61-63). 
4. Water entered Mr. Orosco's home in 2009 and 2010 (R. at 3, 63). 
5. After several years of attempting to determine the source of the water, Mr. 
Orosco had testing performed and substantiated that the water was treated 
culinary water and the only reasonably likely source was Clinton City's 
culinary water system. (R. at 63, 2-3). 
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6. Dennis Guff, manager of Clinton City's Water Department refused to address 
the matter because, he claimed, Mr. Orosco had no proof that the water was 
Clinton City potable water (R. at 56; see also R. at 3). 
7. Although uncomfortable with the limited and circumstantial evidence against 
the City, Plaintiff finally determined that he could no longer delay filing suit 
and brought suit against Gintion City on December 28, 2010. 
Although this information was not before the trial court, it is pertinent to note that in May 
of 2012, during the pendency of this appeal, Mr. Orosco observed Clinton City 
employees performing repairs on a "flush valve" near his home. Mr. Orosco discovered 
that the City opens the valve approximately once per year and that the valve was being 
replaced because it was malfunctioning. The opening of these valves is the likely source 
of the water entering Mr. Orosco's basement and explains the intermittent nature of the 
water. This information suggests that the City was periodically taking affirmative action 
to dump water into the ground near Plaintiffs home but denied liability for the damage 
and potentially withheld information about possible sources of the water during discovery 
in this matter. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in concluding that the continuing tort rule did not apply to the 
facts of this case. Clinton City's motion conceded the facts of the complaint and 
demanded summary judgment on the basis that Mr. Orosco's notice of claim was filed 
more than one year after he discovered his injury. Mr. Orosco's response set out the 
continuing tort doctrine and directed the trial court's attention to the allegations of the 
complaint regarding the ongoing and continuing nature of the alleged negligence and 
nuisance (R. at 68-69). Mr. Orosco's response also indicated that injury had occurred 
during the relevant time period for the limitation period (R. at 63). Because Mr. Orosco's 
claims in the complaint set out the elements of negligence and nuisance during the one 
year period before his notice of claim (R. at 3, particularly ^ 18) and the continuing tort 
doctrine applies to these claims, Mr. Orosco's complaint should not have been dismissed 
and this matter should be remanded for further proceedings. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT VIEW THE FACTS 
PRESENTED IN THE COMPLAINT AND THE INSURANCE CLAIM 
LETTER IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF. 
The motion for summary judgment relied for support on the allegations of 
Plaintiffs Complaint and a letter written by Plaintiff to Clinton City's insurance company 
("the Insurance Claim"). In essence, the motion for summary judgment amounted to a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Because the motion for summary judgment 
conceded the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the allegations of the complaint 
should be treated as established for the purposes of the summary judgment motion. See 
Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah App. 1994) (although defendant sought summary 
judgment, the parties treated the matter as a motion to dismiss and the Court of Appeals 
did the same); see also . Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229,1233 (Utah 
1995) (opponent of motion for summary judgment not required to affirmatively make 
showing of facts not raised by movant). 
The trial court made no factual finding which goes to Mr. Orosco's ability to 
pursue claims for damages as to the year before the notice of claim upon which the 
complaint relied. Rather, the trial court made findings as to various dates and facts which 
have no bearing upon the viability of Mr. Orosco's continuing tort claims (R. at 95). 
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Even if this were not the case, a review of the evidence before the trial court viewed in 
the light most favorable to Mr. Orosco requires factual findings which support his claim 
that the limitation period does not wholly bar his claims against the city. 
None of the findings go to the merits of Mr. Orosco's claims—not even to the 
merits of the claims subject to the proof of claim statute. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-7-402, any claim against Clinton City "is barred unless notice of claim is filed ... 
within one year after the claim arises...." In this case, there were two claims: negligence 
and nuisance. The prima facie elements of a claim for negligence are "(1) that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the 
breach of the duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) that the 
plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or damages." Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, 
1] 9, 125 P.3d 906 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nuisance is not so easily defined, 
but has been described "as a substantial and unreasonable nontrespassory interference 
with the private use and enjoyment of another's land." Turnbaugh for Benefit of Heirs of 
Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 942 (Utah App. 1990), quoting Sanford v. 
University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741, 744 (1971); Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 
380 S.E.2d 198, 200 (W.Va.1989); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D (1979). An 
action for a private nuisance may rest on conduct that is intentional and unreasonable, 
negligent or reckless...." Sanford, 488 P.2d at 745; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822. 
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The trial court made no findings regarding Clinton City's duty, breach of duty, 
causation or damages (see R. at 94-96). Likewise, the trial court made no findings 
regarding the nuisance claims (kL)- Such findings might include that water was not from 
Clinton City water lines, or that Plaintiff did not suffer damages during the year before he 
served the May 10, 2010 notice of claim. Based on the evidence before the Court, no 
such findings could have been made. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 46-47) (facts asserted in support of summary 
judgment: (1) Plaintiff claims damage to his home, (2) Plaintiff filed a claim for water 
damages with insurer on February 10, 2009, (3) the claim for water damages identifies 
various damages which had accrued in February of 2009, (4) Plaintiff claimed that he 
filed a notice of claim on May 10, 2010, and (5) the Complaint was filed on December 
28, 2010). None of the facts set out by Clinton City, the movant below, go toward the 
theories that Clinton City was not causing damages or that no damages occurred during 
the one year before May 10, 2010. 
Because these necessary findings were not made, the Court erred in concluding 
that Plaintiffs claim fails under the continuing trespass doctrine as argued in Point II. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE WHOLLY BARRED BY THE 
LIMITATION PERIOD PROVIDED BY UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 63G-7-402. 
Usually, "the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action 
accrues." Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corporation, 2010 UT 37,1f 56, 235 P.3d 730 
(quotation omitted). The continuing tort doctrine is an exception to this general rule and 
tolls the statute of limitations "while the tortious conduct continues unabated." Bingham 
v. Roosevelt City Corporation, 2010 UT 37, <f[ 56, 235 P.3d 730. Bingham established 
that the continuing tort doctrine applies to negligence actions. Bingham, 2010 UT 37, 
fflf 56-57, 59. The doctrine also applies to nuisance actions. Bingham at ^ 56, citing 
Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1233. 
In Bingham, neighboring well users sued because Roosevelt City was lowering the 
water table and preventing them from getting water. The district court granted summary 
judgment to Roosevelt City in part on the basis that the statute of limitation barred the 
plaintiffs' claims because the first signs of the injury were apparent in the early 1990s— 
more than ten years before the filing of the complaint in 2004. 2010 UT 37 at fflf 6, 54. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the district court's determination that the 
negligence claim was barred by the statute of limitations because "the pumping may be 
discontinued at any time and the alleged damage will be abated." 2010 UT 37 at ]f 59. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Froerer Ahlstrom, PLLC 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Walker Drug, the Utah Supreme Court applied the continuing tort doctrine to an 
action in nuisance and trespass. The trial court granted summary judgment and the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed this determination on appeal, reasoning that because the court 
was unable to "determine as a matter of law whether the alleged contamination is 
permanent or continuing, a question of fact exists which precludes summary judgment on 
statute of limitations grounds." Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 
1232 (Utah 1995). The Court also indicated that the plaintiff in Walker Drug had no 
obligation to show damages within the statutory period because the defendant "failed to 
present evidence that [Plaintiff] did not sustain any damage...." Id- at 1233; compare 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e)("When a motion for summary judgment is ... supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits... must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial."). 
: In Breiggar Properties, L.C., v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53,^11,52 
! P.3d 1133 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court held that dumping dirt one time did not 
constitute a continuing trespass because the trespass was a single discrete act. In 
assessing the facts in Breiggar, the Utah Supreme Court discussed Taygeta Corp. v. 
Varian Associates, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 1053, 436 Mass. 217 (2002). This Massachusetts 
case involved causing subsurface contamination. The court ruled that the statute of 
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limitations did not bar recovery even though no affirmative act had been done in several 
decades because the presence of additional contaminants above ground which continued 
to seep into the ground and increase the harm constituted a continuing trespass. In Utah, 
an act is "permanent" when "the act or acts [] have ceased to occur," and is "continuing" 
when "multiple acts [] have occurred, and continue to occur." Utah Courts have applied 
the principle to wells and held that each time the well was pumped constituted continuing 
negligence which could be discontinued at any time and thereby abate the alleged 
damage. Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corporation, 2010 UT 37,1f 59, 235 P.3cl 730. 
Normally, a notice of claim must be served on a government entity within one 
year of the occurrence. Utah Code Ann § 63G-7-402. A normal tort claim is barred if no 
notice is served—even if an attempt to serve notice is made. See e.g. Cedar Prof Plaza v. 
Cedar City Corp., 131 P.3d 275 (Utah App. 2006). In the situation where a city commits 
a continuing tort, this rule does not apply and a notice of claim may be served and a suit 
may be brought until the negligence or nuisance is abated. See Bingham v. Roosevelt 
City Corporation, 2010 UT 37, ^ 59, 235 P.3d 730. Where a city does not respond to a 
notice of claim, a Plaintiff must file his claim within one year and 60 days from filing the 
notice of claim. Utah Code Ann § 63G-7-403. 
Like in Bingham, the Plaintiff here has been injured by ongoing conduct and 
alleged that Clinton City's water system has been leaking into his basement from time to 
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time since 2004. Complaint at fflf 7,14-16, 18. This is easily distinguished from the 
single dumping incident in Breiggar where the same dirt sat in one place through the 
limitation period. Breiggar at j^ 11. Clinton City's agents affirmatively represented that 
Clinton is not the source of the water in the face of evidence regarding the chlorine and 
fluorine in the water (see R. at 56). Mr. Orosco's theory before the trial court was that 
Clinton City is negligently maintaining its water lines and allowing water to enter the 
ground, travel through the ground, and damage Mr. Orosco's property (R. at 3-4). If Mr. 
Orosco's claims are true, Clinton City could repair its water lines or otherwise cease its 
negligent actions at any time and "the negligence or nuisance would be abated" and the 
flooding would cease in Mr. Orosco's basement. See Bingham v. Roosevelt City 
Corporation, 2010 UT 37, ^  59, 235 P.3d 730. Because Clinton City could cease its 
negligent action at any time and abate the alleged damage, the continuing tort doctrine 
applies under the controlling precedent of Bingham. See 2010 UT 37 at f^ 59. 
The trial court made no finding that water was not from Clinton City water lines. 
The trial court made no finding that Plaintiff did not suffer damages during the year 
before he served the May 10, 2010 notice of claim. Based on the evidence before the 
Court, no such findings could have been made. See Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 46-47) (facts asserted in support of 
j summary judgment: (1) Plaintiff claims damage to his home, (2) Plaintiff filed a claim for 
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water damages with insurer on February 10, 2009, (3) the claim for water damages 
identifies various damages which had accrued in February of 2009, (4) Plaintiff claimed 
that he filed a notice of claim on May 10, 2010, and (5) the Complaint was filed on 
December 28, 2010). None of these facts alleged go toward the theories that Clinton City 
was not causing damages or that no damages occurred during the one year before May 
10,2010. 
The trial court concluded that even under the continuing tort doctrine, "the latest 
point at which a claim could have arisen in this matter was February 2009...." Plaintiff 
seeks to martial evidence in support of this conclusion, but the findings and the presented 
evidence wholly fail to support this combined factual and legal conclusion. The trial 
court appears to have relied upon the information in Mr. Orosco's possession and 
concluded that he should have brought suit sooner.1 This conclusion does not square well 
with the holding of Bingham and should be reversed. 
1
 Although its analysis was limited, the trial court's approach to the matter would be 
consistent with a conclusion that the discovery rule did not toll the limitation period for a 
single negligent act because Mr. Orosco obviously knew of his injury and its source when 
he prepared the Insurance Claim on February 4, 2009. See e.g. Russell/Packard 
Development Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, fflf 12-13, 78 P.3d 616. If the complaint 
alleged a single negligent act combined with Mr. Orosco's knowledge in 2009, the trial 
court's judgment would be unassailable. Because the trial court's approach ignored the 
effect of the continuing tort doctrine, the trial court erred when it dismissed Mr. Orosco's 
complaint. 
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The evidence before the trial court did not contain evidence which would bar a 
claim for damages as to the year to which the notice of claim applies—the time between 
May 10, 2009 and May 10, 2010. Rather, the evidence before the trial court included the 
following: 
1. Water entered Plaintiffs basement each year from 2004 through the filing of 
the Complaint in 2010 (R. at 61-63, particularly ffif 6, 8, 17, 22, 30, 35, 40). 
See also Insurance Claim (R. at 55-56) (2006, 2007), Complaint (R. at 3)(each 
year from 2005 through 2010). 
2. Uncontradicted statements that the entry of water at these times had caused 
damages to Mr. Orosco. Complaint (R. at 3). 
3. The water entering Mr. Orosco's basement was treated drinking water 
containing fluoride and chlorine (R. at 62, 58-59). 
4. The only culinary system close enough to cause this damage to Plaintiffs 
home belongs to Clinton City (R. at 2, 63). 
5. An allegation that Clinton City had failed to properly maintain its water lines 
(R. at 3). 
In the light most favorable to Mr. Orosco, these facts lead to a reasonable inference that 
water is leaking from Clinton City's water lines and causing injury to Mr. Orosco— 
including the time between May 10, 2009 and May 10, 2010. There are obvious 
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measures of damages which were not addressed by Clinton City in its motion, for 
example, loss in use measured by fair rental value. 
A city has a duty to adjoining land owners to maintain the water lines in its 
control. See Egelhoff v. Ogden City, 71 Utah 511, 267 P. 1011 (1928). Water has been 
escaping Clinton City's water lines, including during the claim period, and this is a 
breach of Clinton City's duty. This water entered Mr. Orosco's land and his home and 
caused him injury during the year before he served his notice of claim. Mr. Orosco's 
damages include loss of the ability to use his basement and the time and effort expended 
to remove water from his basement. The facts before the trial court show that some of 
these incidents occurred in the year before the filing of the Complaint. These facts and 
allegations make a prima facie case for trial on this matter. Absent evidence which 
overcomes the reasonable inference that the large amount of water is escaping from 
Clinton City's water lines and entering Mr. Orosco's home, the trial court could not 
properly conclude that Mr. Orosco suffered no damages or otherwise had no 
compensable damages between May 10, 2009 and May 10, 2010. See Walker Drug Co., 
Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1995) (party opposing summary 
judgment need not provide affirmative facts where allegations of complaint are not 
contradicted by movant). Under Walker, the trial court could not throw a burden on 
Plaintiff to affirmatively show specific injury during the limitation period where Clinton 
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City did not attempt to show the absence of injury between May 10, 2009 and May 10, 
2010. W. 
Evidence barring Mr. Orosco's claims might include proof that the leak was from 
a neighbor's water lines, that there was no leaking from Clinton City's water lines during 
the limitation period, or that Plaintiff suffered no damages during the limitation period. 
Unless the court was able to find no dispute as to an essential element of Mr. Orosco's 
claims for the time between May 10, 2009 and May 10, 2010, a dismissal based on the 
limitation period is improper, The trial court erred when it concluded that the continuing 
tort doctrine does not apply to the facts described. 
Summary judgment was granted exclusively on the basis that Mr. Orosco's notice 
of claim was untimely. Because the Plaintiff alleges a nuisance and negligence which are 
both subject to the continuing tort doctrine and raised this issue in response to Clinton 
City's motion for summary judgment, granting summary judgment against Mr. Orosco 
was improper. With all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Mr. Orosco, the 
Insurance Claim and Complaint clearly support a cause of action for nuisance and/or 
negligence. Although damages may be limited to a single year—based on determinations 
the trial court will need to make after remand—Mr. Orosco's claims against Clinton City 
are viable and must be allowed to proceed. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I r.V,^,v„. Al-i lctrom PI I f 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this case, Clinton City demanded summary judgment on the bases that (1) 
plaintiff was aware of his damages by February 10, 2009, and failed to file a notice of 
claim with Clinton City within one year and (2) a notice of claim was filed with the City 
on February 10, 2009 (by giving it to Clinton City's insurance company) and the 
Complaint was filed more than one year after the notice of claim was deemed denied 60 
days after filed. The Complaint sounded in continuing negligence and continuing 
nuisance. To obtain summary judgment, Clinton City bore the burden to present 
evidence that any alleged negligence or nuisance terminated more than one year before 
Mr. Orosco filed his notice of claim on May 10, 2010—or at least to show the court that 
discovery demonstrated that there was no evidence of Clinton City's negligence. See 
Walker Drug, 902 P.2d at 1232-33 (Utah 1995). The problem with approaching this 
question on summary judgment becomes immediately apparent: there is no dispute about 
the presence of the water and whether the water was from Clinton City's pipes or not is a 
question of fact not susceptible to summary judgment on the basis of the evidence in the 
record. 
Clinton City did not present any evidence to show that any alleged negligence or 
nuisance terminated more than one year before this date. Mr. Orosco "cannot be 
penalized for failing to present evidence in opposition" when the allegation of continuing 
negligence and continuing nuisance was not addressed by the motion for summary 
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1 
judgment. See e.g. Walker Drug, 902 P.2d at 1233 (Utah 1995). Looked at another way, 
Plaintiff did not make a motion "supported as provided in [Rule 56]" and Plaintiff 
therefore had no obligation to uset forth specific facts showing that [these other matters 
constituted] a genuine issue for trial." Because Plaintiff properly alleged and the 
evidence presented with the summary judgment demonstrated the elements of a 
negligence action, the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the continuing tort doctrine 
and the provisions of Utah Code Ann § 63G-7-403 require that this matter be remanded 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court remand 
the matter to the trial court with instructions that further proceedings be held to determine 
Plaintiff s claims of negligence and nuisance. 
Dated this ; day of June, 2012. 
FROERER AHLSTROM, PLLC 
Lane S. Froerer 
forneys for Appellant 
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WHrm 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OfcWon District r. 








Judge: DAVID R. HAMILTON 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed September 19, 2011. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition was filed on 
October 7, 2011 and was accompanied by a supporting affidavit. Defendant filed a reply on 
October 18, 2011. Having considered the documentation and argument submitted by both 
parties, the Court herein issues its ruling. 
Pursuant to Section 63G-7-402 of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, a claim 
against a governmental entity is "barred unless notice of claim is filed with the person and 
according to the requirements of Section 63G-7-401 within one year after the claim arises 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental."1 The Court concludes that even under the continuing torts doctrine the latest 
point at which a claim could have arisen in this case is February 2009. Plaintiff did not file a 
notice of claim until May 2010, which is well beyond the year allowed under Section 63G-7-402. 
1
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-402 (2011). 
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Plaintiffs claim, therefore, is barred by applicable statute. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
The Court instructs counsel for Defendant to prepare Findings and an Order consistent 
with this Ruling. 
DATED this *& day of November, 2011 
BY THE COURT 
Dawd R. Hamilton 
strict Court Judge 
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FINDINGS AND ORDER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
(Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment) 
Case No. 100700782 
Judge David R. Hamilton 
Defendant Clinton City, represented by David L. Church of Blaisdell & Church, P.C, 
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter on September 19, 2011. Plaintiff, 
represented by Zane S. Froerer of Froerer, Ahlstrom, PLLC, filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
accompanied by a supporting affidavit on October 7, 2013. Defendant filed a reply on October 
18, 2011. The Court, having considered the documentation and argument submitted by both 
parties, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
// 
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II 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff claims that beginning in September 2004 Clinton City damaged a house 
owned by Plaintiff by negligently allowing City-owned or controlled water to come into 
Plaintiffs basement. 
2. The Plaintiff filed an insurance claim for damages with the City's insurer on or 
about February 10, 2009, titled Insurance Claim for Water Damage. 
3. Plaintiff alleged in the Complaint that he properly filed a notice of claim with the 
City on May 10,2010. 
4. The Complaint in this matter was filed on December 28, 2010. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to Section 63G-7-402 of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, a 
claim against a governmental entity is "barred unless notice of claim is filed with a person and 
according to the requirements of Section 63G-7-401 within one year after the claim arises 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental." 
2. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the latest point at which 
a claim could have arisen in this matter was February 2009, even under the continuing torts 
doctrine. Plaintiff waited until May 2010 to properly file a notice of claim, which is well beyond 
the year allowed under Section 63G-7-402 of the Utah Code. 
3. Plaintiffs claims are barred by Utah Code 63G-7-402. 
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4. There is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, and Defendant Clinton City 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on all of the claims in the Complaint. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
Dated th i sS_ day of C ^ C L 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
strict Court Judgi^f^-y^is. 
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